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Abstract
This Article explores avenues open to South African politicians and jurists in their search for
a more equitable South Africa. Part I examines the international position of customary law. Part
II considers the treatment of customary law elsewhere in Africa and gives particular attention to
unification of laws and legal systems. Part III reviews the experiences of legal dualism in South
Africa’s neighbors, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Part IV discusses customary law in South
Africa. Part V contends that although the unification of laws is a desirable long-term goal for South
Africa, at present it is impractical. Part V also suggests that an integration model that combines
elements of dualism and unification is the most prudent solution to the problems presently facing
South Africa’s legal system.
CUSTOMARY LAW IN A NEW SOUTH
AFRICA: A PROPOSAL
Lynn Berat *
INTRODUCTION
As many in South Africa endeavor to rescue their country
from the horrors of apartheid and transform it into a non-ra-
cial democracy, there is much debate over the nature of the
constitution that will underpin a new legal order.' Of particu-
lar concern to many politicians and jurists is the question of a
bill of rights.2 While major and minor players in the political
struggle all seem committed to adopting a new constitution,3
there remains considerable debate about its contents. 4 Unfor-
tunately, these players focus little attention on what may prove
to be one of the most explosive issues confronting a trans-
formed South Africa, the status of customary law.
Educators and linguists speak often of a right to culture in
South Africa.5 Indeed, the draft bill of rights of the African
National Congress, South Africa's main anti-apartheid organi-
zation, appears to mirror this thinking.6 Article 5 of the draft,
* J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D., Yale University. The author is a Lecturer in
Law at Yale Law School and the Assistant Coordinator of the Career Development
Fellowship Program for Southern Africans at Yale University. She is a member of the
Texas Bar and a consultant to the Ford Foundation on South African and Namibian
issues.
1. See generally, e.g., Lynn Berat, Harmonizing Competing Ethnonationalisms?: A Bill of
Rightsfora New South Africa, 19J. POL. Sci. 90 (1991); Lynn Berat,A New South Africa?:
Prospects for an Africanist Bill of Rights and a Transformed Judiciary, 13 Lov. L.A. INT'L &
CoMp. L.J. 467, 469-78 (1991).
2. See generally, e.g., Berat, A New South Africa?, supra note 1, at 469-78.
3. See David Breier, Raw Power is the Name of the Game, SUNDAY STAR (Johannes-
burg), Aug. 11, 1991, at 6; Shaun Johnson, ANC Throws Down the Gauntlet, STAR (Jo-
hannesburg), Aug. 8, 1991, at 1; Shaun Johnson, Interim Rule Now Thrust of Negotia-
tions, Says ANC, STAR (Johannesburg), Aug. 8, 1991, at 6. These political groups in-
clude the African National Congress, the Democratic Party, the Inkatha Freedom
Party, the ruling.National Party, and the Pan Africanist Congress.
4. See, e.g., Berat, A New South Africa, supra note 1, at 469.
5. See, e.g., Mbulelo Mzamane, Towards a Pedagogy for Liberation: Education for a
National Culture in South Africa, presented at Yale University Southern African Re-
search Program Spring Workshop, Apr. 1991 (on file at office of Southern African
Research Program, Yale University).6. Constitutional Committee of the African National Congress, A Bill of Rights for
a Democratic South Africa: Working Draft for Consultation, reprinted in MONITOR, Dec. 1990,
at 64 [hereinafter Draft Bill of Rights]; see Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South
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for example, is entitled "Rights of Association, Religion, Lan-
guage and Culture."7 The draft's provisions, however, make
no attempt to consider whether the right to use customary law
is part of a right to culture. 8 Moreover, the draft bill's discus-
sion of South African courts does not explicitly mention cus-
Africa, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1989) [hereinafter Constitutional Guidelines]
(reprinting ANC's guidelines). For additional information about the ANC, see, for
example, TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1945, at 1-4, 6, 8-11,
25-30, 36-38, 80-84, 103-10, 120-29, 158-59, 180-82, 201-02, 339-43 (1983).
7. Draft Bill of Rights, supra note 6, art. 5.
8. Draft Bill of Rights, supra note 6. The ANC's proposals provide in part that a
South African Constitution "shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom
Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all
citizens irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed, and shall provide appropriate
mechanisms for their enforcement." Constitutional Guidelines, supra note 6, at 237.
The Draft Bill of Rights staies that "[tihere shall be freedom of association, including
the right to form and join trade unions, religious, social and cultural bodies, and to
form and participate in non-governmental organisations." Draft Bill of Rights, supra
note 6, art. 5, § 1. It also states that "[s]porting, recreational and cultural activities
shall be encouraged on a non-racial basis." Id. art. 5, § 11.
In 1989, the government-appointed South African Law Commission, the views
of which do not necessarily reflect those of the ruling National Party, produced a
working paper that proposed the adoption of a bill of rights. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
COMM'N, PROJECT 58: GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS 471-80 (Working Paper 25, Aug.
31, 1989) [hereinafter Working Paper]. After receiving many comments on its find-
ings and proposals, the Commission produced a report that reviewed the comments
and proposed a revised bill of rights. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMM'N, PROJECT 58:
GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Interim Report, Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Interim Re-
port]. The Interim Report endorsed recognition of a "right, individually or in com-
munity with others, freely to practice the religion and culture and freely to use the
language of his or her choice, so that there shall be no prejudice to or favouring of
anyone on account of his or her religion, culture or language." Id. at 692, art. 18.
The Commission considered the role of customary law in Article 33 of the revised
draft bill, which states that
[e]veryone has the right to have South African law, including the rules of
South African Private International Law, applied in all proceedings before a
court of law: Provided that legislation may provide for the application of the
choice of legal rules relating to and judicial notice of the law of indigenous
groups or the religious law of religious groups: Provided further that in civil
proceedings such indigenous or religious law shall be applied only if all the
parties agree thereto.
Id. at 697, art. 33.
The Commission had received a large number of recommendations that it delete
the provision in the Working Paper draft bill that partially formed the basis for Arti-
cle 33 in the revised bill. Id. at 430; see Working Paper, supra, at 479, art. 29. The
Commission concluded, however, that to delete the earlier provision would invali-
date all legislation providing for the application of indigenous law, a result the Com-
mission considered unjustified. Interim Report, supra, at 430. It also refused an en-
treaty to propose extension of indigenous courts' statutory authority to apply indige-
nous law to criminal proceedings. Id. at 430-31.
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tomary courts.9
South Africa has a dual system of laws and courts.'0 The
customary system has courts of chiefs and headmen, and di-
vorce courts with jurisdiction over African parties.1' The na-
tional system is composed of specialized and administrative
tribunals, magistrates' courts, supreme courts, and the Appel-
late Division, South Africa's highest court. 12 Many, in their un-
derstandable zeal to dismantle apartheid, may ignore the con-
tinued existence of customary law, even though such law af-
fects large numbers of people. It is an issue that the makers of
a new order avoid at their peril.
This Article explores avenues open to South African poli-
ticians and jurists in their search for a more equitable South
Africa. Part I examines the international position of customary
law. Part II considers the treatment of customary law else-
where in Africa and gives particular attention to unification of
laws and legal systems. Part III reviews the experiences of
legal dualism in South Africa's neighbors, Botswana, Lesotho,
and Swaziland. Part IV discusses customary law in South Af-
rica. Part V contends that although the unification of laws is a
desirable long-term goal for South Africa, at present it is im-
practical. Part V also suggests that an integration model that
combines elements of dualism and unification is the most pru-
dent solution to the problems presently facing South Africa's
legal system. This Article concludes that the integration of
customary and national law in South Africa would create a so-
cial order likely to make the eventual unification of South Af-
rica's legal systems possible.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
In recent years, governments around the world have
9. See Draft Bill of Rights, supra note 6, art. 2, §§ 8-24.
10. See J.D. Van der Vyver, Human Rights Aspects of the Dual System Applying to
Blacks in South Africa, 15 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 306, 306 (1982).
11. Id. at 308-09. The fact that African homelands maintain customary law com-
plicates this situation. South Africa has granted a fictional independence to four of
these homelands, an "independence" that no other state recognizes. See infra notes
193-96, 206 and accompanying text (discussing homelands and current South Afri-
can definition of customary law).
12. Id. at 309. The magistrates' courts took over the customary law jurisdiction
of both the commissioners' courts and the appeals court for the commissioners'
courts in 1986. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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shown much interest in customary or indigenous law. This in-
terest affects the development of both national and interna-
tional policies. Aside from domestic organizations tied to na-
tional governments, 13 a number of private and public interna-
tional organizations are also examining issues involving the
use of customary law.' 4 In the international sphere, it is clear
that the status of local customary law is a matter of interna-
tional human rights law that guarantees indigenous peoples
the right to enjoy their own cultures. One aspect of this right
is the right to use their own law.
This position of customary law derives from the incorpo-
ration of the right of non-discrimination into thejus cogens of
the post-World War II period.' 5 In a departure from the Cov-
enant of the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter
propounds universal respect for human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, equality and non-discrimination.' 6 The Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, like the Charter,
does not deal specifically with the question of minorities.17
Since 1948, however, the United Nations has, in certain in-
stances, concerned itself with the position of minorities.'"
13. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, THE RECOGNITION OF AB-
ORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986).
14. James W. Zion, Searching for Indian Common Law, in INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE
STATE 121, 122 (Bradford W. Morse & Gordon R. Woodman eds., 1988) (discussing
international bodies engaged in studying use of customary law); see UNITED NATIONS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECOND (SOCIAL) COMMITTEE 2, 11-
12, U.N. Doc. E/1982/59 (1982) (adopting Report of Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, thus authorizing Sub-Commis-
sion to establish annually working group on indigenous populations).
15. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 470-71 & nn. 104-07 (1988); infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. Jus
cogens is defined as basic, fundamental, imperative, or overriding rules of interna-
tional law, or peremptory norms "which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence
but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect." IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th ed. 1990).
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3.
17. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, 77-78 (1948).
18. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STUDY OF THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF
THE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/367 (1950); CoM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/194 (1958); COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTEC-
TION OF MINORITIES, ACTIVITIES OF ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF
1991-1992]
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Following the adoption of the Charter, the Universal Dec-
laration, and other instruments, the protection of minorities
no longer remained a political problem restricted to certain ar-
eas of the world. Rather, it became an issue concerning all
states, one whose solution had to be found in the need to re-
spect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, for ex-
ample, although the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights of 1966 states that minorities have the right to en-
joy their own culture, language, and religion, such a right
clearly requires recognition by states. ' 9 It seems inconceivable
that a state can have obligations toward its minorities that it
does not have toward its entire population. In this context,
customary law appears to be a part of a people's culture.
The emergence of a right to culture since the 1950s pro-
vides additional support for the argument that states are
bound to foster customary law. Indeed, many conferences
held under the auspices of the United Nations Economic, Sci-
entific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") have empha-
sized the central role of governments in promoting cultural de-
velopment.
Participants at a 1965 UNESCO seminar on multinational
society urged the "recognition of the importance of maintain-
ing permissible legal traditions" in many fields of law. 20 The
seminar's participants unanimously agreed that states should
not impose limitations on the customs of traditional groups.21
The 1970 Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Ad-
ministrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies stressed
that all governments are responsible for the adequate financ-
ing and appropriate planning of cultural institutions and pro-
grams. 22 In 1972, the Intergovernmental Conference on Cul-
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/81, 83, 84, 86 (1949).
19. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 27, re-
printed in 6 I.L.M. 368, 375-76 (1967).
20. See SEMINAR ON THE MULTI-NATIONAL SOCIETY, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/23
(1965).
21. See id. The seminar's participants concluded that a state should intervene
only when a custom "threatened the freedom of others or was contrary to public
order, morality or health-in the sense of constituting an offence known to the law-
or conflicted with the technological, social or economic advancement of the nation as
a whole." Id. para. 115.
22. See U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/13 (1970), ch. 1, para. 51.
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tural Policies in Europe suggested that governments have a
duty to promote the right to culture.23 Two years later, the
UNESCO Seminar on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights of National, Ethnic and Other Minorities encouraged
public financing to support local customs. 24 These pronounce-
ments suggest that international law guarantees a right to cul-
ture and thus binds states.
Given the commitment of various South African political
organizations to promote the cultures of all groups and, there-
fore, customary law, the makers of the new order must over-
come many dangers associated with an attempt to create a cus-
tomary legal system truly representative of and responsive to
the people's needs. Merely to accept the body of law that an-
thropologists designate as customary will do nothing to ad-
vance groups' cultures.25 It may nevertheless be exceptionally
difficult, if not impossible, to discern what exactly the custom-
ary law is because, by its nature, customary law is in a greater
state of flux than written law.
II. THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: ATTEMPTS
AT UNIFICATION
In light of these difficulties, as well as the problems of cre-
ating cohesion and national identity in a society in which
23. See Final Report of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Europe,
U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/20 (1972). A report to the conference suggested that
[t]he right to culture implies a duty for governments and for the interna-
tional community to make it possible for everyone, without distinction or
discrimination of any kind, to take part in the cultural life of his community
and of mankind generally. For this universal participation to be effective,
the State must furnish the necessary means.
UNESCO Doc. SHC/EUROCULT/l, para. 7.
24. See United Nations Seminar on the Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights of
National, Ethnic and Other Minorities, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/49, paras. 10-13 (1974)
[hereinafter UNESCO Seminar] (urging states to adopt "concrete measures" to en-
courage development of minorities' cultures and to promote fundamental freedoms).
The participants deemed it "the responsibility of the authorities to guarantee in law
and in practice the maintenance and preservation of such traditions and customs and
to provide for their autonomous development, where necessary by public financing."
Id. para. 79. See generally UNESCO Seminar, supra.
25. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, The White Man's Burden: Ersatz Customary Law and
Internal Pacification in South Africa, 2 J. HIST. Soc. 41, 41-46, 58 (1989) (concluding
that South African anthropologists who adhere to crude ignorance of or hostility to
customary law contribute to attempts to effect "internal pacification" of South Af-
rica).
1991-19921
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apartheid's adherents elevated the strategy of "divide and
rule" to a high art, many may not view the continued existence
of customary law as a good thing.26 Over the years, some
scholars and politicians have advocated legal unification rather
than dualism.27
Throughout the developing world, governments often
point to the requirements of modernization and the necessity
of fostering national unity as reasons to abandon customary
law and replace it with unitary, national systems.28 In many
African states, governments have viewed customary law with
hostility. As colonizers applied customary law on a racial basis,
many Africans considered its use to be tainted by discrimina-
tion and antithetical to the goals of African nationalism.29
Many nationalists have seen it as representative of the old, un-
progressive order, and have considered Western law, be it cap-
italist or socialist in orientation, as representative of the forces
of modernity, especially in the civil and economic arenas.
Consequently, various African countries dispensed with
customary law when the regimes considered such law to be a
colonial relic.3 0 New governments often addressed questions
of customary law through codification. African codification
26. On the divisiveness of apartheid policies, see LEONARD THOMPSON, A His-
TORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 187-242 (1990).
27. For example, the London Conference on the Future of Law in Africa,
chaired by Lord Denning and held from December 1959 to January 1960, during the
dismantling of much of the British empire, concluded that
uniformity of law would undoubtedly make a valuable contribution to the
administration of the law, and is therefore desirable in principle ...
[B]etween communities and areas there are many variations-especially in
native law and custom-which could and should be eliminated, thereby cre-
ating a greater degree of uniformity than at present exists.
A.N. Allott, What is to be Done with African Customary Law?:" The Experience of Problems and
Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950, 28J. AFR. L. 56, 64 (1984) (quoting Confer-
ence's conclusions). Not all of the Conference's participants, however, represented
Great Britain. Certain African lawyers and judges were present, but they had been
trained in Great Britain and were not necessarily sympathetic to the needs of those
who continued to follow customary law.
28. See M.W. Prinsloo, Pluralism or Unification in Family Law in South Africa, 23
COMP. & INT'L LJ. S. AFR. 324, 329 (1990).
29. See id.
30. In Western law, prime examples of the desire to harmonize law are the Code
Napolon and Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. See Maurice Amos, The Code Napoleon and
the Modern World, 10J. CoMp. LEGis. & INT'L L. 222, 224 (1928) (discussing Code Napo-
lion); Stephen L. Sass, Medieval Roman Law: A Guide to the Sources and Literature, 58 L.
LIBR. J. 130, 130 (1965) (discussing Corpus Juris Civilis).
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commissions typically adopted one of two methods of treating
customary law in their search for its appropriate role in a new
legal order. First, as in Ethiopia, they have endeavored to
change legal systems dramatically by all but abolishing custom-
ary law." The resulting Ethiopian legal code was a synthetic
work based on the civil codes of Egypt, France, Greece, Italy,
and Switzerland. 2 The framers' only concession to Ethiopian
customary law was to permit the country to refuse to incorpo-
rate any law that was antithetical to Ethiopian values.3 3 Yet,
even this grudging acknowledgement of customary law would
have been permitted only if the customary practice were widely
followed, in harmony with the Ethiopian concept of justice, in
accordance with economic progress, and clear enough to be
expressed in civil law terminology.
The second approach to codification has involved the cre-
ation of codes that recognize the continuing vitality of custom-
ary law. This sympathetic approach which, curiously, often en-
joys more support from Western scholars than from African
politicians, derives from a belief that customary law best mir-
rors social reality and comports with people's value systems.
The 1959 Madagascar Code was representative of this view.34
The framers of that code intended to furnish the country with
a unified law,3 but the code did not fully retain customary law.
Rather, it too, albeit in a less pernicious way than in Ethiopia,
modified existing customary law. Madagascar harmonized
31. The French drafter of the Ethiopian Civil Code believed that "it is not an
evolution that the country needs, it is a revolution." Ren6 David, La Refonte du Code
Civil Dans Les Etats Africains, ANNALES AFRICAINES 160, 161 (1962). He viewed cus-
tomary law as unstable, not jurisprudential, too varying, and responsible for Ethio-
pian underdevelopment. Id. He concluded that
Ethiopia cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an empirical fashion a
system of law which is unique to itself, as was done . . . by the Romans and
the English. The development and modernization of Ethiopia necessitate
the adoption of a "ready-made" system; they force the reception of a for-
eign system of law in such a manner as to assure as quickly as possible a
minimal security in legal relations.
Ren6 David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil Law in
African Countries, 37 TUL. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1963).
32. KENNETH R. REDDEN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ETHIOPIA 53-54 (1968).
33. See id. at 53-56.
34. Resolution of the Malagassy Legislative Assembly, June 2, 1959.
35. Id. (providing that Madagascar would adopt a "unified legislation, adapted
to the customs of the different populations of Madagascar and accepted by them"
(translated by the author)).
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conflicting rules, removed rules that the central government
deemed unacceptable, and, in certain instances, consolidated
customary and civil law. In Madagascar, therefore, the change
was evolutionary, while in Ethiopia it was revolutionary.
Nevertheless, attempts to codify or abolish customary law
have generally been doomed to failure.36 Some scholars of
customary law in Africa liken these attempts to the 1926 intro-
duction of the Swiss civil code in Turkey.37 While the im-
ported Swiss code was adequate for urban elites and members
of the legal profession, the vast majority of the people neither
understood nor used it.
It is unrealistic to believe that people will automatically
abandon local customs because an edict comes from their cen-
tral government. The attempts of central governments to re-
move customary law and thereby undermine the power of
"traditional" authorities who uphold it may have unintended
results, causing great resentment among populations whose
traditional law is challenged and, rather than foster national
unity, invigorate separatist movements. Codification attempts
often fail because many African countries have high degrees of
illiteracy,38 and written codes thus have no attraction for the
people.3 9 This is also true in South Africa, where years of
apartheid and "Bantu education" have left many persons illit-
erate.4 o
Some countries, on the other hand, have attemped to
unify only customary laws. The argument advanced in such
cases is that differences in customary law divide the country.4 '
Thus, in the 1960s the Tanzanian government, with the ex-
press objective of fostering national unity, began a unification
36. See generally, e.g., John H. Beckstrom, Handicaps of Legal-Social Engineering in a
Developing Nation, 22 AM.J. CoMp. L. 697 (1974).
37. SeeJ. Keuning, Some Remarks on Law and Courts in Africa, in UNIVERSITY OF IFE
INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES, INTEGRATION OF CUSTOMARY AND MODERN LEGAL SYS-
TEMS IN AFRICA 58, 63-64 (1971) (citing UNESCO, INT'L Soc. Sci. BULL., Vol. IX, No.
1, at 7-85 (1957)).
38. See, e.g., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1991, at 684-771 [herein-
after WORLD ALMANAC].
39. Cf. Beckstrom, supra note 36, at 710 (noting difficulty of population ac-
cepting written code in Ethiopia, where illiteracy is high).
40. See FRANCIS WILSON & MAMPHELA RAMPHELE, UPROOTING POVERTY: THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE 138-49 (1989).
41. Allott, supra note 27, at 65.
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program 42 that produced only superficial uniformity. Yet, it
would seem that conflicts among types of customary law, as
when persons in different groups marry, are insignificant in
comparison to the more substantial problem of the conflict be-
tween customary law and national law. Such conflicts will con-
tinue to occur even if customary law is made uniform or codi-
fied.43
Thus, as South Africans come to terms with apartheid's
legacy, and as concerned politicians, lawyers, and activists
work to instill in them an often nonexistent respect for the rule
of law, it could prove a fatal mistake for the crafters of a new
system to attempt to unify the laws prematurely. In order to
avoid a socio-legal cataclysm, those fashioning a new legal
framework instead should maintain a form of legal dualism, as
have some of South Africa's neighbors with a similar legal past.
III. LEGAL DUALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE
SOUTH AFRICAN INFLUENCE AND THE
EXPERIENCES OF BOTSWANA, LESOTHO,
AND SWAZILAND
A. The Rise of a Hybrid Legal System
The Western system of law that prevails in South Africa is
a hybrid which influenced the laws of Botswana,44 Lesotho,45
and Swaziland.4b Each country derived the peculiar character
of its laws from South African law, whose hybrid or mixed legal
system draws from three main sources of law-Roman, Ro-
man-Dutch, and English.47 Roman law evolved from 753 B.C.,
42. Id. 'See generally Jash Ghai, Ethnicity and Group Relations, in UNESCO, Two
STUDIES ON ETHNIC GROUP RELATIONS IN AFRICA: SENEGAL, THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA 107-09 (1974).
43. Allott, supra note 27, at 66.
44. See infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text (discussing Botswana's legal
system).
45. See infra notes 106-31 and accompanying text (discussing Lesotho's legal sys-
tem).
46. See infra notes 132-58 and accompanying text (discussing Swaziland's legal
system).
47. See W.J. HOSTEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 132 (1983) (discussing South Africa's mixed system of law); Imre Zajtay &
W.J. Hosten, The Permanence of Roman Law Concepts in the Continental Legal System and
South African Law, 2 COMp. & INT'LJ. S. AFR. 181, 197 (1969) (discussing South Af-
rica's mixed system of law).
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the traditional date of the founding of Rome, to 565 A.D.,
when Emperor Justinian died. Roman law survived in medie-
val Europe and influenced its traditions.48
From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the Nether-
lands incorporated elements of Roman law into its own law.
"Roman-Dutch law" soon developed. This law, which enjoyed
its classical period from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth
centuries, synthesized Roman law, German customary law, ca-
non law, feudal law, and perhaps some natural law concepts.4 9
The Dutch East India Company imported Roman-Dutch
law when it established a presence at the Cape of Good Hope
in 1652.50 Roman-Dutch law continued as the common law of
the Cape during the Company's rule from 1652 to 1795.51
When Great Britain's occupation of the Cape began in 1795,
Articles of Capitulation empowered the Raad van Justitie,
renamed the Court of Justice, to administer Roman-Dutch law
in civil and criminal matters.52 Great Britain lost control of the
Cape to the Netherlands in 1803, but regained control in
1806.53
British ascendancy did not signal the end of Roman-Dutch
law at the Cape. The Cape Articles of Capitulation of January
1806 provided that citizens would retain the rights and privi-
leges that they previously enjoyed.54 Some scholars have ar-
gued that this provision ensured the perpetuation of Roman-
Dutch law. 55 In fact, a well-established principle of English law
48. See WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 168-78 (1966). For more on Roman Law, see, for example, FRITZ
SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (1946).
49. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 8
(1978); HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 175.
50. THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 41-43.
51. For studies of the Cape Colony during the period of Dutch control, see THE
SHAPING OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY, 1652-1820 (Richard Elphick & Hermann
Giliomee eds., 1979).
52. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 195.
53. Id. at 195-96.
54. Cape Colony, Articles of Capitulation, 18 Jan. 1806, art. 8, reprinted in THE
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE GOVERNMENT PROCLAMATIONS FROM 1806 TO 1825 (1838).
55. See, e.g., H.D.J. Bodenstein, English Influences on the Common Law of South Africa,
32 S. AFR. L.J. 337, 338 (1915);J.C. de Wet, Die Romeins-Hollandse Reg in Suid-Afrika na
1806, 21 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 239, 239 (1958).
Later, the First and Second Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832, respectively,
confirmed the retention of Roman-Dutch law as the common law. See H.J. Erasmus,
Roman Law in South Afica Today, 106 S. AFR. LJ. 666 (1989).
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provided that a conquered country should retain its laws until
the conqueror changed them.56
Nevertheless, the Cape's legal system did not escape Eng-
lish influence. 57 In 1826, a two-man commission appointed by
the British government to inquire into Cape affairs reported
on Cape judicial matters. 58 It suggested that existing Roman-
Dutch principles be assimilated into English principles, that fu-
ture legislation follow principles of English jurisprudence, and
that English common law be adopted gradually.59 In subse-
quent years, many legislative enactments accorded with these
recommendations, effecting great change in laws of procedure,
evidence, and estate administration.6 0 The Cape adopted
many statutes from English law verbatim or by repromulga-
tion, thereby restructuring laws concerning mercantile ex-
change, companies, and bankruptcy.6'
English law achieved a special influence in the Cape as the
language of the courts. English judges occupied the bench,
and English legal training was required of all advocates. The
use of the English system of government also meant the intro-
duction of English principles of constitutional law. By the end
of the nineteenth century, while Roman-Dutch law remained
the basic common law of the Cape,62 much English law had
56. Campbell v. Hall, [1774] 1 Cowp. 204, 209, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (K.B.
1774) (providing that "laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are
altered by the conqueror"); see DUGARD, supra note 49, at 8.
57. For overviews of English legal principles, see, for example, J.W. GOUGH,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955); W.S. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1926).
58. See generally GEORGE MCCALL THEAL, 25 RECORDS OF THE CAPE COLONY, 1
Jan.-6 Feb. 1826, at 44; C. Graham Botha, The Early Influence of the English Law Upon the
Roman-Dutch Law in South Africa, 40 S. AFR. L.J. 396, 401-03 (1923).
59. See HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 199-202.
60. See, e.g., Ordinance 40 (1828) (adopting English principles of criminal proce-
dure); Ordinance 72 (1830) (adopting English principles of evidence); Ordinance
104 (1833) (replacing Roman-Dutch law of universal succession of heirs with English
system of executorship); Ordinance 15 (1845) (establishing English underhand form
of will); Succession Act, No. 23 (1874) (removing other restrictions on testamentary
transfers); see also Zajtay & Hosten, supra note 47, at 193 (discussing changes).
61. See, e.g., Merchant Shipping Act, No. 13 (1855);Joint Stock Companies Lim-
ited Liability Act, No. 23 (1861); General Law Amendment Act, No. 8 (1879) (revis-
ing maritime and shipping law); Companies Act, No. 25 (1892).
62. See Leslie Rubin, The Adaptation of Customary Family Law in South Africa, in AF-
RICAN LAw: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 196, 198 (Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper eds.,
1965).
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modified it.
63
Although throughout much of the nineteenth century the
Cape did not formally recognize customary law, it generally
recognized transactions based on customary law when they
were not immoral, contrary to public policy, or in conflict with
Cape law.64 In 1864, for example, the Cape enacted the Native
Succession Act, which recognized the application of customary
law in the administration of the estates of permanent resident
Africans .65
During this period, Roman-Dutch law, as modified by
English law, spread from the Cape to the British colony of Na-
tal and to the Afrikaner Republics of the Orange Free State
and the Transvaal.66 While all three territories adopted the
Roman-Dutch system, English law, operating through the law
of the Cape Colony, modified the Roman-Dutch law of each.
Each territory recognized customary law, but to different de-
grees. 6 7 After the South African War of 1899-1902,68 when the
63. Zajtay & Hosten, supra note 47, at 193.
64. Rubin, supra note 62, at 200.
65. Id. British Kaffraria, incorporated the next year, recognized the same excep-
tion. Id. Nevertheless, British Kaffraria continued to permit magistrates to apply
"their own ideas of equity, Cape and native law." Id.
The Cape Colony, in fact, also had a second system for the recognition of cus-
tomary law. Id. at 201. In the Transkei, customary law was recognized from the day
the territory was incorporated into the Cape Colony. Id. at 200. Magistrates were
required to apply colony law, but could apply customary law when all parties were
Africans. Id.
66. For a constitutional history of the Afrikaner republics, see Leonard Thomp-
son, Constitutionalism in the South African Republics, BUTrERWORTH'S S. AFR. L. REv. 49
(1954).
67. See Rubin, supra note 62, at 201-03.
In Natal, which Great Britain annexed in 1843, customary law could prevail ex-
cept when it was repugnant to general principles of humanity. Id. at 201. At first,
African chiefs could exercise their traditional judicial functions, and after 1875 courts
of administrators of native law could rule on customary law. Id. Natal did exempt
certain Africans from the operation of customary law, although these Africans did not
acquire the legal status of whites. Id. at 202.
The Transvaal at first did not recognize customary law. Id. In 1885, however, it
adopted Law 4, which provided for the recognition of customary law not inconsistent
with "general principles of civilisation," but subjected the judgments of native com-
missioners, subcommissioners, government-appointed chiefs, and appeals tribunals
to government modification or reversal. Id.
In the Orange Free State, where few Africans settled, the question of recogniz-
ing customary law was not pressing, although, as in the Cape, the colony recognized
customary law in certain administrative proceedings. Id. at 203.
68. See Lynn Berat, Constitutionalism and Mineral Law in the Struggle for a New South
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two former Afrikaner republics and the two British colonies
joined to form the Union of South Africa, Roman-Dutch law
remained the common law. 69 This system continued after the
Union became the Republic of South Africa in 1961.70
In gaining rule over Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland,
Great Britain intended that the three eventually be incorpo-
rated into South Africa. 7 In addition to installing South Afri-
can law as the territories' national law, however, Great Britain
also chose to retain customary law, the hallmark of its policy of
indirect rule. This decision created a dualism in all three in-
stances which, to varying degrees, exists to the present day.
The following discussion of these countries' legal systems will
identify issues and concerns that the framers of the new South
African legal order should consider.
B. Customary Law in Botswana
Formerly the Bechuanaland protectorate, Botswana,
which is largely desert, occupies an area the size of France and
has a population of about one million.72 The country, unlike
the vast majority of African states, is a democracy. 73 Its demo-
cratic tradition was not developed under Western influence,
Africa: The South African War Revisited, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. - (1992) (forth-
coming) (discussing war of 1889-1902).
69. See L.M. THOMPSON, THE UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 1902-1910, at 459
(1960).
70. THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 188. South African law had effectively become
a "three-layer cake" of Roman, Dutch, and English law. Zajtay & Hosten, supra note
47, at 197. One South African justice explained:
Our country has reached a stage in its national development when its ex-
isting law can better be described as South African than Roman Dutch....
No doubt its roots are Roman Dutch, and splendid roots they are. But con-
tinuous development has come through adaptation to modern conditions,
through case law, through statutes, and through the adoption of certain
principles and features of English law . . . . The original sources of the
Roman-Dutch law are important, but exclusive preoccupation with them is
like trying to return the oak tree to its acorn.
Exparte de Winnaar, [1959] 1 S. Afr. 837, 839 (Natal).
71. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 69, at .271-79 (discussing anticipated an-
nexation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland to South Africa). At the time,
Botswana and Lesotho were known as Bechuanaland and Basutoland, respectively.
72. See A.J.G.M. Sanders, Constitutionalism in Botswana: A Valiant Attempt at Judicial
Activism, 16 COMP & INT'L LJ. S. AFR. 350, 350 (1983).
73. Id. at 351; see THOMAS TLOU & ALEC CAMPBELL, HISTORY OF BOTSWANA 235
(1984).
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but rather is centuries old.7 4
Botswana inherited a dual legal system. The formula by
which the country received the common law dates to the adop-
tion of the General Administration Proclamation of 189 1.7
The General Law Proclamation of 1909 amended the 1891
proclamation and provided that the written and common laws
of the Cape as of 1891 would become the laws of Botswana.76
The move toward unification since the 1960s has occurred
primarily in law, and to a lesser extent in the nature and struc-
ture of the court system. The major instrument regarding cus-
tomary law is the Customary Law (Application and Ascertain-
ment) Act of 1969 (the "Act"). 7 7 The Act codifies rules to re-
solve conflicts between customary and common law,78 and
defines customary law as the law of any tribe or tribal commu-
nity that is compatible with written law and not "contrary to
morality, humanity or natural justice." 79 Under the Act, all
other law is common law.80 Customary law applies in proceed-
ings between tribesmen unless: (1) the transaction is intended
to be considered under the common law; (2) the transaction is
unknown to customary law, or (3) the parties agree to adjudi-
cation under the common law.8'
74. See TLOU & CAMPBELL, supra note 73, at 71-72.
75. General Administration Proclamation (1891).
76. General Law Proclamation, No. 36, § 2 (1909).
77. Customary Law (Application and Ascertainment) Act, No. 51 (1969) [herein-
after Customary Law Act]; see C.M.G. Himsworth, The Botswana Customary Law Act,
1969, 16J. AFR. L. 4 (1972).
78. Customary Law Act, supra note 77, §8 4-10. For example, section 6 requires
that in all child custody cases, the welfare of the child must be the primary considera-
tion in determining which law to apply. Id. § 6. Section 7 requires that customary
law apply in cases of intestate succession when tribesmen are involved. Id. § 7. Sec-
tion 8 stipulates that common law must be applied in a suit for damages for death or
personal injury that involves a tribesman. Id. § 8.
79. Customary Law Act, supra note 77, § 2. The act defines a "tribesman" as a
member of either a tribe, a section of a tribe, a tribal community, a community organ-
ized in a tribal manner living outside tribal territory of Botswana, or any African
country's tribe or tribal community as prescribed by a posted notice of the Minister
of Justice. Id. Although modern scholars generally avoid using the words "tribe,"
"tribesman," and "tribal," this Article will retain their use in discussing legislation
that uses the terms.
80. Id. (defining common law as "any law, whether written or unwritten, in force
in Botswana other than customary law").
81. Id. § 4; see Anne Griffiths, Legal Duality: Conflict or Concord in Botswana?, 27J.
AFR. L. 150, 150 (1983).
The Customary Law Act does not reveal how to determine tribal membership.
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Conflicts between different sets of customary laws often
arise as well. 2 Section 10 of the Customary Law Act resolves
conflicts between customary laws 83 and provides that if a court
cannot ascertain a particular system of customary law, it shall
determine the applicable law "in accordance with the princi-
ples ofjustice, equity and good conscience." 84 In order to aid
the ascertainment of customary law, the Act permits courts to
take notice of customary law and to consult experts, reported
cases, and textbooks if there is any uncertainty about a particu-
lar facet of customary law. 85 In addition, any statements of
customary law authorized by Botswana's president constitute
prima facie evidence of customary law.86
Although Botswana's private law system remains dualistic,
the country has made great strides toward the unification of
The question of who is a tribesman occasionally arises when a party disclaims such a
label. In those cases, the Customary Courts Act of 1961 provides for a Customary
Courts Commissioner who, after due inquiry, issues a certificate that binds the party
to his finding. Customary Courts Act, No. 19, § 2(3) (1961).
82. This situation prevails because Botswana's African population is not ethni-
cally homogeneous. The majority Tswana group is divided into the Kgatla, the
Kwena, the Malete, the Ngwaketse, the Ngwato, the Rolong, and the Tlokwa. Other
ethnic groups are the Birwa, the Herero, the Kalanga, the Kgalagadi, the Mbukushu,
the Sarwa, and the Subiya. For a discussion of Tswana law, see, for example, SIMON
ROBERTS, TSWANA FAMILY LAW (1972) and I. SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW
AND CUSTOM (1970).
83. Customary Law Act, supra note 77, § 10. The Act provides:
(1) In any case where customary law is applicable and the question
arises as to which system of customary law is applicable-
(a) in land matters the applicable customary law shall be the cus-
tomary law of the place where the land is situate;
(b) in cases and proceedings arising from inheritance the appropri-
ate customary law shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), be
the customary law applying to the deceased;
(c) subject to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) the court
shall apply the customary law which the parties intended or may reason-
ably be deemed to have intended should regulate their obligations in
the matter or, in the absence of such actual or deemed intention, the
customary law of the place where the action arose.
Id. § 10(1).
84. Id. § 10(2).
85. Customary Law Act, supra note 77, § 11. Before the act's passage, national
courts considered customary law a factual matter to be proved. See, e.g., Gideon v.
Malusalila, 1926-53 High Comm'n Terr. L.R. 114, 115E. Courts thus could not take
judicial notice of customary law.
86. Customary Law Act, supra note 77, § 12. In practice, however, because most
national court judges are still foreigners, they tend to rely on a few general publica-
tions which, unfortunately, fail to capture the dynamic nature of customary law.
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public law. An almost uniform system of substantive criminal
law derives from the Penal Code,87 the African Courts
(Amendment and Supplementary Provisions) Act of 1968,88
and the Customary Courts (Amendment) Act of 1972.89 Other
acts have regulated the functions of tribal chiefs. 90 Botswana's
1966 constitution nevertheless contained a bill of rights that
protected certain aspects of customary law. 9'
Despite its considerable progress toward the unification of
its legislation, Botswana has been slow to unify its court sys-
tem. The colonial court structure remains intact. While the
national courts consider the national law their primary law, the
subordinate customary courts primarily apply customary law.
The statutory authority for the customary courts is con-
tained in the Customary Courts (Amendment) Act. The act es-
tablishes a hierarchy of customary courts, including a custom-
ary court of appeal.92 The Customary Courts Commissioner
oversees the customary courts and exercises discretion "in the
interests of justice" in transferring cases between customary
courts, or from a customary court to a national court.93
The Customary Courts (Amendment) Act states that cus-
tomary law usually applies in customary courts. The act distin-
guishes between criminal and civil cases, a non-existent dis-
tinction in customary law.94 In criminal cases, customary
courts have jurisdiction only over "tribesmen" or those who
agree in writing to the courts' jurisdiction. A customary court
may review offenses committed wholly or partly within its area
of jurisdiction. 95 Customary courts' criminal jurisdiction is
87. Penal Code, No..2 (1964); see A.J.G.M Sanders, The Internal Conflict of Laws in
Botswana, in Y.B. AFR. L. 137, 138 (Kurt Madlener ed., 1984).
88. African Courts (Amendment and Supplementary Provisions) Act, No. 57
(1968); see Sanders, supra note 87, at 138.
89. Customary Courts (Amendment) Act, No. 6 (1972); see Sanders, supra note
87, at 138.
90. See generally Tribal Land Act, No. 54 (1968) (giving major administrative
powers of chiefs concerning land to non-tribal public bodies); Matimela Act, No. 25
(1968) (giving major administrative powers of chiefs concerning stray cattle to non-
tribal public bodies); Chieftainship Act, No. 29 (1965) (regulating recognition and
functions of chiefs).
91. BOTSWANA INDEPENDENCE ACT, ch. 23, § 2 (1966).
92. Customary Courts Act, supra note 81.
93. See Sanders, supra note 87, at 147-48.
94. Customary Courts Act, supra note 81, § 12.
95. Id. § 1 l(l)(b). The Customary Courts Commissioner may, following a de-
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similar to that of national courts, with certain exceptions.96
In civil cases, customary courts have jurisdiction if all par-
ties are "tribesmen" or if the defendant consents in writing to
the court's jurisdiction. 97 A customary court may assert terri-
torial jurisdiction when a defendant resides in the court's juris-
diction, or if a cause of action arises in that jurisdiction. 9s The
Minister of Local Government and Lands determines the
courts' material civil jurisdiction. 99 As in the criminal law field,
the act excludes certain civil actions from customary courts' ju-
risdiction.'0 0
The Customary Court (Procedure) Rules, promulgated
under the Customary Courts Act, govern evidentiary and pro-
cedural matters in customary courts. l1 In both criminal and
civil cases, however, customary courts have some discretion to
apply national laws.' 012
fendant's request, transfer a case to another customary court or a lower national
court. Id.
96. Id. § 12. Offenses over which customary courts have no jurisdiction include
bankruptcy and company law, bigamy, bribery, "corruption and abuse of office,"
counterfeiting, extortion, offenses allegedly affecting the state's security or safety,
offenses allegedly causing death, offenses relating to the administration of justice,
offenses relating to precious metals and stones, rape, riot, treason, and other offenses
that may be prescribed. Id.
97. Id. § 10(l)(a).
98. Id. § l0(l)(b).
99. Id. § 6.
100. Id. § 12. These include bankruptcy and other transactions non-existent
under customary law, termination of marriages not concluded according to custom-
ary law, testate succession and decedents' estates when national law applies, and,
unless the Customary Courts Commissioner consents to the assertion ofjurisdiction,
witchcraft. Id.
101. See Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules (1971).
102. In S. v. Thokomelo, 1981 Bots. L.R. 272, High CourtJustice Corduff noted
that "there is substantially less difference than might be supposed between the law
and rules of evidence and procedure applicable in customary courts and those appli-
cable in other courts." Id. at 273. Although the difference between national and
customary rules differ more markedly in civil cases than in criminal cases, High Court
Chief Justice Dendy-Young commented, perhaps optimistically, that the customary
courts retain the "fundamental, all-pervasive rule of fairness, sometimes called natu-
ral justice, [which] still demands that no evidence shall be relied upon unless the
opposing party has been given an opportunity to comment thereon." Gombgwa v.
Gombgwa, No. CIV/APP/3, at 4 (High Ct. 1970).
In criminal law cases, customary courts apply customary law but may consult the
Penal Code. Customary Courts Act, supra note 81, at § 11. They may impose fines or
imprisonment, or authorize corporal punishment. Id. §§ 11(2), 11(5), 16-19. In civil
cases, customary courts may use national law provisions, as national law or a ministe-
rial order may permit. Id. § 15.
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The Botswana system of allowing a plaintiff to sue in na-
tional court even though a customary court has jurisdiction has
created a problem of forum shopping. 10 3 Botswana's legisla-
ture partially addressed this problem in the Subordinate
Courts (Amendment) Act of 1969 by providing limitations on
plaintiffs' ability to choose the forum. 0 4 It provides that once
a case has begun in a lower national court, the court may trans-
fer the case to a customary court if it deems customary law ap-
plicable, provided that such a transfer is "not contrary to the
interests of justice." 105
C. Customary Law in Lesotho
Lesotho, a country of nearly two million that is entirely
surrounded by South Africa and has few natural resources, is
the poorest country in this study, although it has one of Af-
rica's highest literacy rates. 10 6
Legal dualism in Lesotho is an enduring legacy of colonial
rule. In 1884, Lesotho, then known as Basutoland, adopted
General Law Proclamation 2B, which provided that the British
High Commissioner in Cape Town would administer Basuto-
land through the officers of a deputy commissioner who, in
turn, would be represented locally by a resident commis-
sioner.10 7 The establishment in 1911 of the Court of the Resi-
dent Commissioner effected a curious separation of powers.
The resident commissioner was still responsible to the High
Commissioner in administrative matters, but answered to the
Privy Council in London on judicial matters.10 8 The Resident
Commissioner's Court applied customary law in all cases be-
tween Africans. 0 Eventually, a judicial commissioner took
charge of the resident commissioner's court, and the Central
and Local Courts Proclamation of 1938 established a dual
103. T.W. BENNETr, THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
34 (1985).
104. See id. at 93 (discussing Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act, No. 23,
§ 31A (1969)).
105. Id.
106. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 38, at 728.
107. General Law Proclamation 2B (1884); see W.C.M. Maqutu & A.J.G.M. Sand-
ers, The Internal Conflict of Laws in Lesotho, 20 CoMp. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 377, 378
(1987).
108. See Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 378.
109. Id. at 378-79.
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court system that has existed to this day." ° The proclamation
established customary courts, which were inferior to national
courts and whose presidencies went not to "traditional" chiefs
but to government appointees."'
Lesotho's national courts generally apply the national law,
while the customary courts apply the customary law. 1 2 For
"Africans," however, customary law remains as important as
national law.' '3 General Law Proclamation 2B gives national
courts the discretion to apply customary law when they serve
as courts of first impression if all parties to a suit are "Afri-
cans."' 114 In practice, national courts generally apply custom-
ary law when they hear appeals from customary courts." 15 The
110. Central and Local Courts Proclamation, No. 62 (1938); see Maqutu & Sand-
ers, supra note 107, at 379. The Proclamation was originally named the Native
Courts Proclamation. VERNON V. PALMER & SEBASTIAN M. POULTER, THE LEGAL SYS-
TEM Ov LESOTHO 490-91 (1972).
111. Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 379. Although the customary courts
are statutorily inferior to national courts, "so far as the African inhabitants of
Lesotho are concerned, African law stands basically on an equal footing with the
common law. In no sense is the customary law placed in a fundamentally inferior or
subsidiary position as it is in some other African countries, e.g., Botswana and Swazi-
land." PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 99-100.
112. See BENNETT, supra note 103, at 87.
113. See Motali v. Moreira, No. CIV/T/193 (High Ct. 1977), quoted in 11 CoMp.
& INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 347 (1978). The court found that
[i]t appears abundantly clear... that the common law of the Cape of Good
Hope was the law to be administered by the courts of Basutoland. The ex-
ception permitting the application of African law was confined to matters in
which all the parties are Africans. . . . Sesotho law remains on an equal
footing with the common law in so far as Africans are subject to that law.
Id.
Lesotho once considered an "African" to be "any aboriginal African belonging
to any tribe of Africa, and all persons of mixed race living as members of any African
community, tribe, kraal, village or location in the Territory." General Interpretation
Proclamation, No. 12 (1942). Today, "African" is undefined in Lesotho law because
a 1977 act repealed the 1942 proclamation and left the determination of who is an
African to the courts. See Interpretation Act, No. 19 (1977). See generally Maqutu &
Sanders, supra note 107, at 392 n.31 (discussing changing understanding of meaning
of "African").
"Customary law," "Sesotho law," and "Sotho law" all describe the customary
law applied among the Basotho people in Lesotho. See PALMER & POULTER, supra
note 110, at 99.
114. General Law Proclamation 2B, supra note 107, § 2.
115. See Chabaseoele v. Mohale, 1977 Lesotho L.R. 283, 288-89. See generally
High Court Act, No. 5 (1978). Although the High Court Act indicates that the High
Court must give permission if the court wishes to be the court of first impression, it
need not do so in cases involving customary law. Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107,
at 394.
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proclamation includes a repugnancy clause, which provides
that customary law is that law used by the people that is not
repugnant to "justice or morality" or inconsistent with legisla-
tion. 16 The clause limits the use of customary law to cases in
which its application comports with justice or morality." 7
Before Lesotho's independence in 1966, the judges of the
High Court used assessors or expert witnesses to ascertain cus-
tomary law.' 18 The Court sometimes required that to prove
the existence of customary law, a party had to show that a cus-
tomary law rule was well-established and "reasonable." '"19
Since Lesotho's independence, the High Court has continued
to use assessors, but now takes judicial notice of customary
law. ' 2  Three main factors contributed to this shift. First, the
judiciary began to be indigenized, and the new judges believed
that requiring proof of customary law demeaned Lesotho's in-
dependent status.' 12  Second, an increasing number of works
on Basotho law appeared. 22 Third, there is a growing body of
116. Central and Local Courts Proclamation, supra note 110, § 9.
117. Id. Judge Goldin of the Court of Appeal wrote that "it could never have
been intended that in applying customary law in other courts . . . it can be done
regardless of its repugnancy to morality or justice." Ntle v. Khaketla, No. CIV/APP/
3 (1983), quoted in Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 380. Judge Goldin inter-
preted "justice or morality" broadly, arguing that
Sesotho customary law will not be condemned or not applied on the ground
that it is repugnant to justice and morality merely because it is different
from and does not accord with concepts of morality or justice under Roman-
Dutch law. It is implicit and obvious that where two systems of law exist,
each of them may be based on different principles or concepts of morality or
justice.
Id.
In practice, the High Court has invoked the repugnancy clause in only a few
cases. E.g., Ntsoele v. Ramokhele, 1974-75 Lesotho L.R. 130, 132E-133A; Malofot-
sane v. Mpho, 1959 High Comm'n Terr. L.R. 107; see Maqutu & Sanders, supra note
107, at 380. A possible reason is that most High Court judges, including all High
Court judges before 1974, were foreigners who found it difficult to rule on a system
of law foreign to them. See id. at 381.
118. See Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 383.
119. See Griffith v. Griffith, 1926-53 High Comm'n Terr. L.R. 50; Maqutu &
Sanders, supra note 107, at 383.
120. High Court Act, No. 4, §§ 8-9 (1967) (permitting use of assessors in
courts); see BENNETt, supra note 103, at 34. The Court will try to determine and use
customary law only if "its content or authority is brought into question and the
[pending] matter cannot be determined in any other, more convenient manner." Id.
121. Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 384.
122. Only a few written sources of Basotho customary law exist. PALMER &
POULTER, supra note 110, at 105. One is an 1872 report on the laws and customs of
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customary law precedent. 23  The Judicial Commissioner's
Court and customary court decisions are not published, how-
ever, and no readily available compilation exists for judicial
reference. 24
The nature of Lesotho law, and the High Court preference
for maintaining the dual court system, contribute to a lengthy,
unwieldy appeals process. 25 When a case reaches a central
court or the Judicial Commissioner's Court, the court may de-
cide it or send it back to the court of first impression or to
another customary or magistrates' court. 26  Magistrates'
courts may send cases to other customary or magistrates'
courts.' 27  The efficiency of the appeals process is also hin-
dered by the Judicial Commissioner's Court, a colonial relic
that sits only once a year in each district. 28
Forum shopping is also a problem.' 29 Few statutory con-
flict of laws rules exist. 3 0 As a result, courts have developed
the Basotho. See id. at 105-06 (citing REPORT AND EVIDENCE OF COMMISSION ON NA-
TIVE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE BAsuros (1873)). Another source is the Laws of
Lerotholi, which contains an incomplete declaration of Sesotho law and custom.
PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 106-07; see Sebastian Poulter, The Place of the
Laws of Lerotholi in the Legal System of Lesotho, 71 AFR. AFF. 144 (1972) (discussing Laws
of Lerotholi). Other sources include a few books, monographs, and court decisions.
See PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 107-08; see also, e.g., PATRICK DUNCAN,
SOTHO LAws AND CUSTOMS (1960); VERNON V. PALMER, THE ROMAN-DtrCH AND
SESOTHO LAW OF DELICT (1970); SEBASTIAN POULTER, FAMILY LAW AND LITIGATION IN
BASOTHO SOCIETY (1976). Unfortunately, because customary law is particularly fluid,
these sources may be of little or no help to modern jurisprudence.
123. See Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 384.
124. See PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 116. These authors note that
customary law, "being dependent upon the practises of those who are subject to it[,]
is liable to change in accordance with usage and is therefore not constant.... [1lt is
difficult of access for those who do not regulate their lives by it since it is still largely
unwritten." Id.
125. Under the Central and Local Courts Proclamation, supra note 110, appeals
lie from the local to the central courts, from the central courts to the Judicial Com-
missioner's Court, from the Judicial Commissioner's Court to the High Court, and
from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, Lesotho's highest court. d. § 28. Ap-
peals to the High Court and the Court of Appeal require the permission of the court
concerned, and appeals to the Court of Appeal must be on a point of law. Id. §§ 27-
28. See generally PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 481.
126. Central and Local Courts Proclamation, supra note 110, § 30.
127. Id. § 26.
128. Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 394. TheJudicial Commissioner usu-
ally has an interest and experience in customary law, and uses an assessor when nec-
essary. PALMER & POULTER, supra note 110, at 488.
129. Maqutu & Sanders, supra note 107, at 394-95.
130. Id. at 389.
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their own rules to deal with such cases as succession and mar-
riage.' 3 1 Unfortunately, these judicial decisions have not re-
sulted in a coherent body of conflicts laws.
D. Customary Law in Swaziland
Swaziland, a country of 800,000 persons which gained in-
dependence in 1968, accepted principles of foreign law in
1907.132 It adopted many Roman-Dutch legal principles as its
own, including statutes from the Transvaal.1 33
In Swaziland, which is dominated by a monarchy, there is
considerable respect for customary law. Section 62(2) of the
1968 Constitution, which established Swaziland's indepen-
dence, prohibited legislative interference with a number of
customary institutions.' 34  In 1973, a royal proclamation re-
pealed the 1968 Constitution, 135 but in 1981 another royal
131. Id. at 389-92; see, e.g., Rakhoabe v. Rakhoabe, 1967-70 Lesotho L.R. 210,
211-13 (noting that South African law on marriage in community of property, which
controlled at start of instant marriage, no longer controlled in Lesotho, although
opinion did not refer to comparable or applicable Basotho law); Khatala v. Khatala,
1963-66 High Comm'n Terr. L.R. 97, 100B (relying on Basotho custom and law to
resolve dispute concerning marriage and succession).
132. General Law and Administration Proclamation No. 4, § 3 (1907). For his-
tories of Swaziland, see, for example, ALAN R. BOOTH, SWAZILAND: TRADITION AND
CHANGE IN A SOUTHERN AFRICAN KINGDOM (1983); J.S.M. MATSEBULA, A HISTORY OF
SWAZILAND (1987); JOAN Scurr, THE STORY OF SWAZILAND (1983).
133, General Law and Administration Proclamation, supra note 132, §§ 1-2.
Sections 1 and 2 provided:
(1) The Roman-Dutch common law, save in so far as the same has been
heretofore or may from time to time hereafter be modified by statute, shall
be the law in Swaziland;
(2) Save and except in so far as the same have been repealed or amended,
the statutes in force in the Transvaal on the 15th day of October, 1904, and
the statutory regulations thereunder, shall mutatis mutandis and as far as they
may be applicable be in force in Swaziland ....
Id.
134. INDEPENDENCE CONST., No. 50, § 62(2) (1968). These institutions included
the appointment and removal of chiefs, the composition and rules of procedure of
the Swazi National Council, the "first fruits ceremony," the offices of the King and
Queen Mother, the regency, and the regimental system. Id.; see id. § 135.
135. Proclamation by His Majesty King Sobhuza II, Apr. 12, 1973 [hereinafter
Proclamation]; see Peter Nanyenya Takirambudde, External Law and Social Structure in
an African Context: An Essay About Normative Imposition and Survival in Swaziland, 16
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 209, 225-26 (1983) (discussing Proclamation). The proc-
lamation did not refer to section 62(2) of the 1968 Constitution, supra note 134, be-
cause the King disbanded parliament. See King's Proclamation, supra. Swaziland cre-
ated a new parliament in 1978. See Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland,
Order 23 (1978).
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proclamation referred to the customary institutions enumer-
ated in the 1968 constitution as "matters to be regulated by
Swazi law and custom. ' 13 6 In 1983, an amendment to this
proclamation indicated that such customary matters were be-
yond the jurisdiction of national courts.' 3 7
Swazi customary law is not statutorily defined. The Swazi
Courts Act of 1950 contains a repugnancy clause, which re-
stricts the use of customary law if it is contrary to "natural jus-
tice or morality."'' 3 8 Such a vague standard may make judges'
personal conceptions of natural justice and morality determi-
native and, as in other African countries with many white
judges, may offer a way for national courts to strike down many
aspects of customary law. It is quite remarkable, therefore,
that the High Court has only twice remarked upon the repug-
nancy clause, both times in dicta, once by a Swazi judge and
once by a white judge. i3 9
The duality of laws has given rise to a dual court system,
to difficulties in proving the primacy of customary law, and to
confusing conflict of laws rules. National courts generally re-
view national law, while the customary courts, established by
the Swazi Courts Act of 1950,140 generally review customary
law. 4 ' Swazi courts are inferior to national courts. 4 2 The ap-
peals provisions in the Swazi Courts Act illustrate this relation-
136. King's Proclamation (Amendment) Decree 1 of 1981. This decree made
official recognition of customary law retroactive to 1979. Id.
137. King's Proclamation (Amendment) Decree 1 of 1983.
138. Swazi Courts Act, No. 80, § 11 (a) (1950) [hereinafter Swazi Courts Act].
This vague standard resembles those that once prevailed in Botswana and Lesotho.
See supra notes 79 & 117 and accompanying text (discussing similarly vague statutes
restricting use of customary law in Botswana and Lesotho).
139. Dlamini v. Twala, 1979-81 Swaz. L.R. 117 (High Ct.) (disallowing custom-
ary practice of giving child born out of wedlock to father's family upon payment to
mother's family of cattle or money); R. v. Mhlabane, 1977-78 Swaz. L.R. 188 (High
Ct.) (permitting customary marriage of fourteen-year-old girl and recognizing her
consent to sexual intercourse with husband); see AJ.G.M. Sanders, The Internal Conflict
of Laws in Swaziland, 19 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 112, 114 (1986).
140. Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, § 3.
141. BENNETr, supra note 103, at 96. Swazi courts may receive statutory permis-
sion to hear cases involving national law, while national courts may in some instances
apply customary law. Sanders, supra note 139, at 122-23.
142. Sanders, supra note 139, at 123. High Court Chief Justice Nathan once
noted that
[a]lthough a certain degree of autonomy is conferred by the legislature
upon the Swazi National Courts, they are not a law unto themselves; they
are a limb of the administration ofjustice in this kingdom, and they must
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ship. In civil cases involving customary law, appeals lie to a
Swazi Court of Appeal and then a Higher Swazi Court of Ap-
peal, before going to the national High Court.'43 The proce-
dure for appeals in criminal cases differs. Before they may lie
to the High Court, criminal appeals from the Higher Swazi
Court of Appeal lie first to the Judicial Commissioner's Court,
a colonial relic staffed by civil servants who are usually foreign-
ers and are neither lawyers nor individuals trained in Swazi
customary law.' 44 In practice, this system of appeals seems
quite unwieldy for a small country with limited resources. 45
As in Botswana, Swaziland makes other distinctions be-
tween the treatment of criminal and civil cases in customary
courts. 4 6 In criminal cases, Swazi courts may assert personal
jurisdiction in a case when the complainant and the accused
are "members of the Swazi nation."'' 47 A customary court may
assert proper venue when the alleged offense was committed
entirely or partially within the court's jurisdiction.'4 8 Swazi
courts may mete out any punishment allowed by Swazi custom-
ary law, except death, as long as the punishment is not con-
trary to "natural justice and humanity."'' 49 In both civil and
criminal matters, however, all parties must be members of the
Swazi nation.'5 0 The defendant must ordinarily reside within
the territorial area of the court's jurisdiction, or the cause of
action must have arisen there.' 5 '
work in harmony and in conjunction with other limbs thereof, notably the
High Court.
Fix Gama v. R., 1970-76 Swaz. L.R. 462, 462H (High Ct.).
143. Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, §§ 28(1), 33(4).
144. Id. §§ 28(1), 33(3).
145. See Fix Gama, 1970-76 Swaz. L.R. at 464C-F. The court stated that "the
Swazi Courts Act requires revision and streamlining in many respects .... [T]he
system of appeals through the Swazi Court of Appeal, Higher Court of Appeal, and
Judicial Commissioner to the High Court and thence, if necessary, to the Appeal
Court, is in my opinion unnecessarily prolix and cumbersome." Id. at 464C-D.
146. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting Botswana's distinction be-
tween criminal and civil cases).
147. Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, § 8(2). In practice this definition refers
to members of the Swazi ethnic group, not Swazi citizenship. Sanders, supra note
139, at 125.
148. Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, § 8(2).
149. Id. § 12. Punishment must be "commensurate with the nature and circum-
stances of the offence and the circumstances of the offender." Id.
150. Id. § 7(1).
151. Id.
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There are many instances of considerable divergence be-
tween national and customary law, particularly in matters of
damages, estates, evidence, and family law.' 52 The scattering
of conflict of laws rules is also a problem.' 53 These problems,
combined with the vagueness of and qualifications to civil and
criminal rules, encourage forum shopping, one of the major
difficulties with Swaziland's system.154
Another obstacle to harmonizing the court systems is that
many judges in national courts are still foreigners. 55 More-
over, national judges need not always apply customary law,
even when it may be applicable.' 56 As a result, many courts do
not take judicial notice of Swazi customary law.
Unfortunately, little material is available to prove the pri-
macy and principles of customary law. Few texts exist, and de-
cisions of customary courts are not published. 5 7 To remedy
this problem, as in Lesotho, the High Court often turns to "as-
sessors," 158 who try to explain the relevant prevailing elements
of customary law. Unfortunately, because customary law is dy-
namic, an assessor's comments on old texts may bear little re-
semblance to prevailing customary legal reality.
IV. LEGAL DUALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
At present, the amount of literature on South African cus-
152. Sanders, supra note 139, at 127.
153. See, e.g., id. at 124-27; see also Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, § 8(2) (dis-
cussing customary courts' territorial jurisdiction over criminal matters), §§ 9(a)-(c)
(discussing customary courts' subject matter jurisdiction), §§ 30, 31, 33, 35 (discuss-
ing appeals); High Court Act, No. 20, § 4(1) 1954 (discussing appeals to High
Court); Magistrate's Courts Act, No. 66, § 16(1) (1938) (discussing ability of clerk of
magistrate's court to transfer case to customary court when both parties are Swazi
and cause of action may be suitable for customary court).
154. See Sanders, supra note 139, at 124-27.
155. See id. at 128.
156. In Dlamini v. Nhlengethwa, 1977-78 Swaz. L.R. 79, 81 (High Ct.), Chief
Justice Nathan concluded that when a magistrate believes that a case is appropriate
for a customary court but does not transfer it, the magistrate need not apply Swazi
law and custom. Id. at 81. He added that "[a] fortiori is the position the same in the
High Court where there is no machinery for transfer of an action to a Swazi court."
Id.
157. See generally, e.g., J.M.A. FANNIN, PRELIMINARY NOTES ON PRINCIPLES OF
SWAZI CUSTOMARY LAW (1967); B.A. MARWICK, THE SWAZI (1940); N.N. RUBIN, THE
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE (1964).
158. Swazi Courts Act, supra note 138, § 35 (providing for assessors); see High
Court Act, No. 20, § 6(1)(b) (1954) (providing for assessors).
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tomary law compares favorably with the amount in other Afri-
can countries. 159 In the mid-1800s, following decades during
which informal sources provided discussions of customary law,
several texts that detailed customary laws appeared.160 There-
after, other texts, incorporating Western or African anthropo-
logical perspectives, were published.' 6 ' Nevertheless, custom-
ary law in South Africa remains largely unwritten. 16 2
In South Africa, the first law that considered the status of
customary law was the Black Administration Act of 1927.163
The act provided for chiefs' and headmen's courts, which
could apply only customary law,' 64 and commissioners' courts
and native appeals courts, which could apply either customary
or common law. 165 Section 12 of the act empowered chiefs or
headmen to hear civil cases between Africans.' 66 In addition,
section 20 gave chiefs or headmen the authority to try and
punish any African who committed particular offenses.' 6 7
Section I 1 (1) of the Black Administration Act, which con-
cerns commissioners' courts and native appeals courts, was
based upon laws that had existed in the Transkei province
prior to the South African union in 1910.168 It authorized
159. See BENNETr, supra note 103, at 26.
160. See id. at 25-26. These texts included the Compendium of Kafir Laws and
Customs and the Natal Code of Zulu Law. See id.; see also J.C. BEKKER, SEYMOUR'S
CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 11 (5th ed. 1989).
161. See BENNETT, supra note 103, at 26 (discussing books on South African and
Tswana native law).
162. BEKRER, supra note 160, at 11. For a further discussion on the ascertain-
ment of customary law in South Africa, see infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
163. Black Administration Act, No. 38 (1927). The act was once also known as
the Bantu Administration Act.
Perhaps the most significant case on customary law prior to passage of the Black
Administration Act was Van Breda v. Jacobs, 1921 App. Div. 330. The court con-
cluded that for a court to take notice of a custom, "first [the custom] must be imme-
morial, secondly it must be reasonable, thirdly it must have continued without excep-
tion since its immemorial origin, and fourthly it must be certain." Id. at 334. The
party seeking application of customary law bore the burden of proving a custom's
existence. Id. at 333.
164. Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 12(l).
165. Id. § 11(1); see BENNETT, supra note 103, at 26 & n.66. The act authorized
commissioners' courts and the appeals court for commissioners' courts to use African
assessors in an advisory capacity. See Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 19;
BENNETT, supra note 103, at 29 & n.91.
166. Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 12.
167. Id. § 20.
168. Id. § I (l); compare id. with BEKKER, supra note 160, at 3-4 (discussing
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these courts to determine whether African customary law was
to be applied in each case. 169 Thereafter, native appeals courts
deemed several factors relevant in determining whether they
should apply customary law, including the nature of the act,' 70
the intention of the parties, 17 1 the residence of the parties, 72
whether a defense existed in only one legal system, 173 and
stare decisis. 174
Compounding the confusion, courts differed as to their
discretion to use customary law. In some cases, courts as-
sumed that they had discretion, 75 but could not exercise it ar-
bitrarily. 7 6 In other decisions, courts determined that com-
missioners did not have complete discretion. t7 7
The uncertainty about which legal system deserved pri-
macy was another problem. At least one South African court
thought that the common law was primary, 78 while others sug-
Transkei magistrates' courts' discretion to apply customary law). Section 11 pro-
vides, in relevant part, that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law, it shall be in the discre-
tion of the courts of Bantu Affairs Commissioners, in all suits or proceed-
ings between Bantu involving questions of customs followed by Bantu, to
decide such questions according to the Bantu law applying to such customs
... [p]rovided that such Bantu law shall not be opposed to the principles of
public policy or natural justice.
Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 11 (1); see R.S. Suttner, Towards Judicial
and Legal Integration in South Africa, 85 S. AFR. L.J. 435, 435 n.l (1968) (quoting sec-
tion 11 (1)). "Bantu law" concerned "those aspects of African tribal law which have
been recognized by the courts as well as certain additions and amendments which
they have made." Id.
169. Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 11(1); see Suttner, supra note
168, at 435 n.l (quoting section 11(1)).
170. See, e.g., Bakacu v. Mbuwana, 1930 N.A.C. 78, 79 (Cape & Orange Free
State).
171. E.g., Dodo v. Sabasaba, 1945 N.A.C. 62, 63 (Cape & Orange Free State).
172. See, e.g., Mhlongo v. Sibeko, 1937 N.A.C. 34, 37 (Natal & Transvaal).
173. See Dhlamini v. Ngubane, 1948 N.A.C. 14, 15 (N.E.); Lebona v. Ramokone,
1946 N.A.C. 14, 16 (Cape & Orange Free State).
174. Fuzile v. Ntloko, 1944 N.A.C. 2, 3 (Cape & Orange Free State); Moima v.
Matladi, 1937 N.A.C. 40, 43-44 (Cape & Orange Free State).
175. Mhlongo v. Mhlongo, 1937 N.A.C. 124, 126 (Natal & Transvaal); Magadla
v. Hams, 1936 N.A.C. 56, 58 (Cape & Orange Free State).
176. E.g., Magidela v. Sawintshi, 1943 N.A.C. 52, 53 (Cape & Orange Free
State).
177. E.g., Nqanoyi v. Njombeni, 1930 N.A.C. 18, 19 (Cape & Orange Free
State).
178. Id.
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gested that customary law should prevail over common law.' 79
Still others thought that the two systems enjoyed equal sta-
tus. 180
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court entered the
fray in 1948 in Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v.
Beyi. 18 Justice Schreiner wrote that the native commissioner
should exercise his discretion "without regarding either of the
systems of law as primafacie applicable," although he provided
no guidelines as to how the commissioner could make that de-
termination. 82 Nothing more specific emerged from the 1953
case of Umvovo v. Umvovo,18 3 in which Justice Schreiner indi-
cated that a court should determine not whether the assistant
native commissioner had exercised his discretion properly, but
rather "whether the conclusion that native law should be ap-
plied was in the circumstances a proper one. "184
After Yako, the Native Appeals Court began delivering a
number of decisions that laid down rules defining the limits of
a commissioner's discretion and prescribing certain require-
ments. For example, the court held that a commissioner could
consider the intention of the parties, 85 the areas in which the
parties lived,' 8 6 and whether a cause of action existed only
under one system of law.' 87 While such pronouncements
helped clarify the nature of discretion in the Native Appeals
Court, confusion reigned in the magistrates' courts, which also
considered the effect of customary law.
Section 54A(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1944 was
179. Sawintshi v. Magidela, 1944 N.A.C. 47, 47 (Cape & Orange Free State);
Moima v. Matladi, 1937 N.A.C. 40, 44 (Natal & Transvaal).
180. E.g., Mhlongo v. Mhlongo, 1937 N.A.C. 124, 125 (Natal & Transvaal).
181. [1948] 1 S. Afr. 388 (App. Div.).
182. Id. at 397. Justice Schreiner concluded that Parliament, in enacting section
11 (1) of the Black Administration Act, supra note 163, "appears to have used a device
which may have been expected to permit of some elasticity and provide scope for
development.., without laying down any hard and fast rule as to the system of law to
be used [to achieve equitable decisions]." Id.
183. [1953] 1 S. Afr. 195 (App. Div.).
184. Id. at 201. Althought the Appellate Division did not set down clear rules
on conflicts of law after Yako and Umvovo, the frequency with which reported cases
concerned conflicts lessened considerably. BENNET'T, supra note 103, at 79.
185. See Mbonjiwa v. Scellam, 1957 N.A.C. 41, 43-44 (S.).
186. Mokoba v. Langa, 1952 N.A.C. 76, 77 (S.).
187. E.g., Ngwenya v. Zwane, 1959 N.A.C. 28, 29 (N.E.); Langa v. Khuzwayo,
1958 N.A.C. 63, 65 (N.E.).
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similar to section 11(1) of the Black Administration Act. 8'
The section gave magistrates discretion to apply customary law
in cases between Africans that involved questions of customary
law, including matters related to the criminal judgments of
chiefs' courts. 189 In essence, the magistrate and the commis-
sioner had the same jurisdiction in applying customary law.
Decades passed before this system changed. In 1983, af-
ter widespread dissatisfaction with many aspects of the legal
system, a government-appointed Commission of Inquiry into
the Structure and Functioning of the Courts, also known as the
Hoexter Commission, issued a report that urged many re-
forms. 190 The Commission recommended the abolition of the
separate criminal jurisdiction of the commissioners' courts and
the abolition of the civil jurisdiction of both the commission-
ers' courts and the appeals court for commissioner's courts.19
A major difficulty with the Hoexter Commission's report
was that the drafters did not consider the report's implications
for South African customary law in the so-called "national
states." These "national states" are homelands to which
South Africa intended to grant fictional independence in order
to "denationalize" Africans in the land of their birth.' 92 The
National States Constitution Act of 1971 had granted the
homelands the authority to enact legislation concerning magis-
188. Compare Magistrates' Courts Act, No. 32, § 54A(i) (1944) with Black Ad-
ministration Act, supra note 163, § I 1(1); see A.J. Kerr, Customary Law in Magistrates'
Courts and in the Supreme Court, 103 S. AFR. L.J. 526, 528 (1986) (discussing section
54A(1)).
189. Magistrates' Courts Act, supra note 188, § 54A(i); see Kerr, supra note 188,
at 528. Section 54A(l) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]otwithstanding the provi-
sions of the Act or any other law a court may in all suits or proceedings between
Blacks ...involving questions of customs followed by Blacks, take judicial notice
thereof and decide such questions according to the Black law applying to such cus-
toms." Magistrates' Courts Act, supra note 188, § 54A(l); see Kerr, supra note 188, at
528.
Similar to laws in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, section 54A also provided
that laws not be contrary to public policy and natural justice. Magistrates' Courts
Act, supra note 188, § 54A(2); see Kerr, supra note 188, at 530-35 (discussing section
54A(2)). The section also codified conflict of laws rules. Magistrates' Courts Act,
supra note 188, § 54A(2); see Kerr, supra note 188, at 530-35 (discussing section
54A(2)).
190. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE
COURTS (1983).
191. Id. at 413-14.
192. See John Dugard, South Africa's "Independent "' Homelands: An Exercise in Dena-
tionalization, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11 (1980) (discussing homelands).
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trates' courts. 193 As a result, any such South African legislation
passed after the act came into force would have had no effect in
these homelands. An additional problem was that the act gave
the homelands authority over chiefs' courts, thereby nullifying
the effect of African legislation.'94 Moreover, the Commission
completely ignored the systems of customary law existing in
the four "independent" homelands of Bophuthatswana, the
Ciskei, the Transkei, and Venda, and thus maintained the fan-
tasy that they are not part of South Africa. 195
The government disregarded these problems when it en-
acted the Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act in 1986.196
The Act retained the chiefs' courts, the National States Consti-
tution Act courts, and the African divorce court. 9 7 However,
it abolished other courts for Africans, specifically the commis-
sioners' courts and the appeals court for commissioners'
courts, and transferred their jurisdiction to the magistrates'
courts.' 98 In doing so, the act made no provision for magis-
trates to receive training in customary law, and did not stipu-
late that the Supreme Court was to take judicial notice of cus-
tomary law.
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act of 1988,'99 which
repealed section 54A of the Magistrates' Courts Act,200 partly
193. Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act, No. 21, sched. 1, item 12
(1971). The act was formerly known as the National States Constitution Act, but was
renamed pursuant to the National States Constitution Amendment Act, No. 111
(1990).
194. See id.
195. Each of the "independent" homelands has a system governing customary
law embodied in its constitution and its indigenous courts' act. See Bophuthatswana
Constitution Act, No. 18, § 67(2) (1977); Ciskei Constitution Act, No. 20, § 61
(1981); Transkei Constitution Act, No. 15, § 53(2) (1976); Venda Constitution Act,
No. 9, § 51(2) (1979); see also BEKKER, supra note 160, at 65. For more on these terri-
tories' constitutions, see generally THE CONSTITUTIONS OF TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHAT-
SWANA, VENDA AND CISKEI (M.P. Vorster et al. eds., 1985). Each of these homelands
also has an indigenous courts act. See Traditional Courts Act, No. 29 (1979)
(Bophuthatswana); Administrative Authorities Act, No. 37 (1984) (Ciskei); Chiefs'
Courts Act, No. 6 (1983) (Transkei); (South African) Black Administration Act, No.
38 (1927) (Venda); see also BEKKER, supra note 160, at 18-22.
196. Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act, No. 34 (1986).
197. See generally id.
198. Id. § I. The act repealed many sections of the Black Administration Act,
including section 11(1), discussed supra at notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
199. Law of Evidence Amendment Act, No. 45 (1988). See generally A.J. Kerr,
Customary Law in All Courts, 106 S. AFR. LJ. 166 (1989) (discussing act).
200. Law of Evidence Amendment Act, supra note 199, § 2.
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remedied the problems related to judicial notice of customary
law. Section 1 (1) permits any court to take judicial notice of for-
eign state law and indigenous law.20' Significantly, this section
omits the requirement in section 54A(1) of the Magistrates'
Courts Act that both parties to a case must be black South Afri-
cans for a court to apply customary law.2"2 Section 1(2) per-
mits any party to the proceedings to offer evidence of the rele-
vant customary law.2 °0 Section 1(3) attempts to resolve con-
flicts among customary laws,20 4 while section 1(4) defines
"indigenous law" as "the Black law or customs as applied by
the Black tribes," including those in the "territories which for-
merly formed part of the Republic," meaning the independent
homelands.20 5
Unfortunately, the act does not require that judicial of-
ficers always take notice of customary law. Given the inability,
and in many cases the unwillingness, of white judicial officers
to ascertain customary law, the framers of the act could at least
have permitted courts to call expert witnesses when they are
unable to establish relevant customary law by other means.
Unlike earlier acts, the act does not provide for the courts' use
of assessors to ascertain custom. 20 6 Sections 1(1) and 1(2) to-
gether place the evidentiary and financial burdens of proving
201. Id. § 1(1). Section 1(1) of the act provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny
court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so
far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty: Provided that
indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural
justice." Id.
202. Compare Law of Evidence Amendment Act, supra note 199, § 1(1) with Mag-
istrates' Courts Act, supra note 188, § 54A(l) and Kerr, supra note 188, at 528.
203. Law of Evidence Amendment Act, supra note 199, § 1(2).
204. Id. § 1(3). This section provides that
[i]n any suit or proceedings between Blacks who do not belong to the same
tribe, the court shall not in the absence of any agreement between them with
regard to the particular system of indigenous law to be applied in such suit
or proceedings, apply any system of indigenous law other than that which is
in operation at the place where the defendant or respondent resides or car-
ries on business or is employed, or if two or more different systems are in
operation at that place (not being within a tribal area), the court shall not
apply any such system unless it is the law of the tribe (if any) to which the
defendant or respondent belongs.
Id.
205. Id. § 1(4).
206. See id. The Black Administration Act had permitted courts the use of asses-
sors. See Black Administration Act, supra note 163, § 19(l); supra note 165 (discussing
section 19(1)).
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customary law on the parties. These burdens may prove exces-
sive, particularly if the parties are, like so many Africans, illiter-
ate and impoverished. Such a system favors the parties with
better connections, education, and financial resources.
V. THE WAY FORWARD?: AN INTEGRATION MODEL FOR
SOUTH AFRICA
The destructiveness of apartheid in South Africa has left
the country with daunting social welfare problems that de-
mand urgent attention. To ensure the efficient administration
of justice, while at the same time guaranteeing a right to cul-
ture, the architects of the new order should follow an integra-
tion model. This approach requires the greatest possible inte-
gration of customary law and the supreme national law. While
unification, the imposition of a uniform law, is more desirable
in terms of efficiency, legal integration is more viable in the
near future because it will bring together laws of diverse ori-
gins without destroying them and minimize social disloca-
tion. 27 Legal integration would allow the varying laws to con-
tinue to exist, but would standardize their effects and remove
conflicts among them.20 8
Integration will not be easy to achieve because of funda-
mental differences between customary and national law. The
onslaught of corrupting colonial influences has not removed
the communal nature of customary law and the individualistic
nature of national law.20 9 Under customary law, kinship per-
meates the social structure, and legal proceedings concern the
community as much as the individual, because communities
often strive to foster reconciliation and harmony.210 As a re-
sult of this communal orientation, customary law is usually un-
written.21 ' The lack of legislation and written law makes it dif-
ficult to ascertain precedent. Codes such as the Laws of Ler-
207. Allott, supra note 27, at 65; see Prinsloo, supra note 28, at 325 (concluding
that "[ilntegration embodies a practical approach to the question of unification,
namely that unification can be achieved gradually or by a cumulative process, unify-
ing rules where this is possible and leaving matters which cannot be unified to the
personal laws of the parties").
208. Allott, supra note 27, at 65.
209. See A.J.G.M. Sanders, Legal Dualism in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: A
General Survey, 1 LESOTHO L.J. 47, 57 (1985).
210. See id.
211. See BEKKER; supra note 160, at 11; BENNETT, supra note 103, at 17 & n.3.
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otholi in Lesotho 2 2 and the Natal Code of Zulu Law in South
Africa 21 3 are merely restatements, not bodies of original legis-
lation. Treatises on customary law are few and not necessarily
reflective of the dynamic nature of customary law. Moreover,
the customary law emphasis on conciliation and communalism
makes it difficult for Western-trained jurists to think of custom-
ary law in terms of a national law that is divided, as is much
Western law, into public and private law.
Nevertheless, if South African jurists are to make any
strides in modifying the legal system, the precise content of
customary law must be determined. In 1983, a Committee on
Indigenous Law, which advised the South African government
on research projects on indigenous law, ceased operations
before jurists could restate the findings of the Committee's an-
thropologists. 2 4 Another group, working at the Centre for In-
digenous Law of the University of South Africa, began restate-
ment work in 1977215 and has thus far produced four books
and two introductions to indigenous law.21 6
The completion of a comprehensive restatement project
in South Africa will be particularly difficult. There are rela-
tively few African lawyers and, consequently, only a few quali-
fied jurists with any facility in indigenous languages. 2 17 Com-
pounding the problem is the fact that these African lawyers
have received their training in schools that do not imbue stu-
dents with sensitivity to customary law and legal institutions.1 8
212. See supra note 122 (discussing Laws of Lerotholi).
213. See BEKKER, supra note 160, at 11.
214. See M.W. Prinsloo, Restatement of Indigenous Law, 20 CoMp. & INT'L LJ. S.
AFR. 411, 417 (1987).
215. Id. at 417-18.
216. See, e.g., INDIGENOUS CRIMINAL LAW IN BOPHUTHATSWANA (A.C. Myburgh
ed., 1980); A.C. MYBURGH, PAPERS ON INDIGENOUS LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1985);
A.C. MYBURGH & M.W. PRINSLOO, INDIGENOUS PUBLIC LAw IN KWANDEBELE (1985);
M.W. PRINSLOO, DIE INHEEMSE ADMINISTRATIEFREG VAN 'N NOORD-SOTHOSTAM
(1981); M.W. PRINSLOO, INHEEMSE PUBLIEKREG IN LEBOWA (1983).
217. Black lawyers comprise less than ten percent of South Africa's 10,000 law-
yers. Interview with Arthur Chaskalson, National Director of the Legal Resources
Centre of South Africa at the Ford Foundation, in New York, N.Y. (May 29, 1991).
218. See generally J.B.K. Kaburise, The Role of Legal Education in a Changed South
African Society: An Outsider's Reflections, 20 COMp. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 316 (1987).
In recent months there have been calls for a new law school curriculum. Some
schools have instituted courses intended to heighten students' concern about the re-
lationship between law and society, For example, since 1985, students at the Univer-
sity of Natal School of Law have been required to take a course entitled "Race Legis-
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These lawyers have not been trained in the research and field-
work techniques that would be required for the ascertainment
of customary law."' In view of the small number of highly ed-
ucated black South Africans, the anthropologists who would
likely accompany the lawyers in the fieldwork would almost
certainly be white South Africans or foreigners. Informants
may view such anthropologists with suspicion or even hostility.
Many errors of interpretation of customary law could occur as
a result.
Once customary law is ascertained, South Africa should
undertake a two-step process to integrate it into a national
legal system. First, in the initial period, the basic dualism of
the legal system would remain, but the laws of the different
ethnic groups would be harmonized.220 Second, after a period
in which, ideally, South Africa will develop a more favorable
social climate, the country could replace the diverse customary
and national systems with one integrated system that would al-
low for dualism when necessary.
The road to national-customary integration may be long
and difficult. The experiences of other African nations with
dual legal systems suggest that South Africa should pay partic-
ular attention to procedural matters. 22 1 Rules regulating con-
flicts between customary and common law rules should be de-
veloped and codified. For the sake of simplicity, these should
be devised for all areas of law and located in a single statute.
In addition, one might consider the adoption of a rule that cus-
tomary law will apply in civil matters unless both parties clearly
intend that national law apply. A further rule might empower
or even require customary courts to apply national criminal
law, a field in which customary and national law already tend to
lation." See, e.g., RACE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA Vii (Aj. Rycroft et al. eds.,
1987). The author is not aware of any discussion of integrating customary law into
the curriculum.
In contrast, law faculties in all South African universities teach Roman law,
whose study is required for bachelor's degrees in law. See Erasmus, supra note 55, at
673.
219. Cf. Kaburise, supra note 218, at 317 (discussing need for more training in
customary law in South African law schools).
220. See Prinsloo, supra note 28, at 325 (stating that harmonization "seeks to
eliminate points of friction between ... different legal systems but leaves the systems
to continue to exist separately").
221. See supra notes 72.158 and accompanying text (discussing dual legal sys-
tems of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland).
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be closely related. Such changes would help eradicate the
problem of forum shopping.222
National courts in South Africa must also be required to
take judicial notice of customary law. Such a directive will
prove impossible to fulfill, however, as long as whites domi-
nate the national judiciary and magistracy. Even if increasing
numbers of Africans occupy such positions, it will be exceed-
ingly difficult for those not trained in customary law to take
judicial notice of it.
The need for training in customary law requires a recast-
ing of the South African law school curriculum that tailors it to
the needs of the country. 223 The law schools should emphasize
and require the study of customary laws for graduation. Partic-
ular attention should be devoted to inculcating the view that
customary law is neither ineffective nor inferior to national law.
The goal of integration should be to make eventual unifi-
cation possible. As suggested above, while Botswana is follow-
ing a definite trend toward unification 224 South African unifica-
tion may still be far off. Before government officials and jurists
begin to think about unification schemes, many other battles
must be waged, including those for national reconciliation,
eradicating illiteracy, and improving the economy. Only in
such a changed environment would it be possible for a com-
mitment to unification to gain popular support and thrive.
CONCLUSION
As South African politicians and jurists debate the nature
of the new constitution that South Africa must have to help
dismantle the legacy of apartheid, their discussions fail to con-
sider the fate of customary law. While there is mention of a
right to culture, there is no examination of whether that right
includes the rights to apply and to use customary law. Under
international law, however, the right to culture incorporates
the right to use customary law. Should agreement be reached
in South Africa that customary law will continue to exist, the
222. In countries such as Swaziland, the retention of strict dualism has proved
to be one of the greatest obstacles to creating legislative and judicial harmony. See
supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text (discussing Swaziland's court system).
223. The law schools could also serve as venues for the training of magistrates.
224. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing Botswana's pro-
gress toward unification of laws).
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form in which it will survive remains unclear. Some African
governments, in their zeal to create uniformity and speed de-
velopment, have chosen to abandon customary law, while
others have maintained a strict dualism between customary
and national law. In general, however, unification has been
unsuccessful. A survey of the experiences of three of South
Africa's neighbors-Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland-indi-
cates that dualism is also fraught with problems. Accordingly,
for now South Africa should adopt an integration model that
would foster the social harmony that one day may make legal
integration possible.
